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Abstract
We introduce a class of learning problems where the agent is presented
with a series of tasks. Intuitively, if there is a relation among those tasks,
then the information gained during execution of one task has value for the
execution of another task. Consequently, the agent is intrinsically moti-
vated to explore its environment beyond the degree necessary to solve
the current task it has at hand. Thus, in some sense, the model explain
the necessity of curiosity. We develop a decision theoretic setting that
generalises standard reinforcement learning tasks and captures this intu-
ition. More precisely, we define a sparse reward process, as a multi-stage
stochastic game between a learning agent and an opponent. The agent
acts in an unknown environment, according to a utility that is arbitrarily
selected by the opponent. Apart from formally describing the setting, we
link it to bandit problems, bandits with covariates and factored MDPs.
Finally, we examine the behaviour of a number of learning algorithms in
such a setting, both experimentally and theoretically.
1 Introduction
This paper introduces sparse reward processes. These capture the problem
of acting in an unknown environment, with an arbitrary unknown sequence of
future objectives. The question is: how to act so as to perform well in the current
objective, while at the same time acquiring knowledge that might be useful for
future objectives? It is thus analogous to a number of real-world problems with
high uncertainty about future tasks, as well as the more philosophical problem
of motivating the utility of curiosity in human behaviour.
We formulate this setting in terms of a multi-stage game between a learn-
ing agent and an opponent of unknown type. The agent acts in an unknown
Markovian environment, which is the same in every stage. At the beginning of
each stage, a payoff function is chosen by the opponent, which determines the
agent’s utility for that stage. The agent must act not only so as to maximise
expected utility at each stage, but also so that he can be better prepared for
whatever payoff function the opponent will select at the next stage.
We call such problems sparse reward processes, because of two types of
sparseness. The first refers to payoff scarcity: the payoff available at every
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stage is bounded, while the agent wants to maximise the total payoff across
stages. The second refers to the fact that the payoff function is sparse for an
adversarial opponent. We posit that this is a good model of life-long learning
in uncertain environments, where while resources must be spent learning about
currently important tasks, there is also the need to allocate effort towards learn-
ing about aspects of the world which are not relevant at the moment. This is
due to the fact that unpredictable future events may lead to a change of pri-
orities for the decision maker. Thus, in some sense, the model “explains” the
necessity of curiosity.
While our main contribution is the introduction of the problem, we also
analyse some basic properties. We show that when the opponent is nature, the
problem becomes an unknown MDP. For adversarial opponents, a good strategy
for a two-stage version of the game is to maximise the information gain with
respect to the MDP model, linking our formulation to exploration heuristics such
as compression progress [Schmidhuber, 1991], information gain [Lindley, 1956]
and approximations to the value of information [Koller and Friedman, 2009,
Sec. 23.7]. For the general adversarial case, we show that either sampling from
the posterior Strens [2000] or confidence-bound based approaches [Auer et al.,
2002, Jacksh et al., 2010] perform well compared to a greedy policy. However,
when the opponent is nature, a greedy policy performs very well, as the payoff
stochasticity forces the agent to explore.
The next section introduces the setting and formalises the environment, the
payoff, the policy and the complete sparse reward process. Sec. 3 examines the
properties that arise for the two opponent types: nature and adversarial. Sec. 4
briefly explains two algorithms for acting in SRPs, derived from two well-known
reinforcement learning exploration algorithms based on confidence bounds and
Bayesian sampling respectively. The experimental setup is described in Sec. 5,
while Sec. 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of related work and links to
other problems in reinforcement learning and decision theory.
2 Setting
The setting can be formalised as a multi-stage game between the agent and an
opponent, on a stochastic environment ν. At the beginning of the k-th stage the
opponent chooses a payoff ρk, which he reveals to the agent, who then selects
an arbitrary policy πk. It then acts in ν using πk until the current stage enters a
terminating state. This interaction results in a random sequence of state visits
s, whose utility for the agent is ρk(s). The agent’s goal to minimise the total
expected regret
∑
k V
∗
k − Vk, where Vk , V (ρk, πk) is the expected utility and
V ∗k , supπ V (ρk, π) is the maximum expected utility for that stage.
If the dynamics are known to the agent, then selecting πk maximising the
total expected payoff, only requires playing the optimal strategy for each stage
and disregarding the remaining stages. When ν is unknown, however, learning
about the environment is important for performing well in the later stages. The
setting then becomes an interesting special case of the exploration-exploitation
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problem.
2.1 The environment
At every stage, the agent is acting within an unknown environment. We as-
sume that the opponent, has no control over the environment’s dynamics and
that these are constant throughout all stages. More specifically, we define the
environment to be a controlled Markov process:
Definition 1. A controlled Markov process (CMP) ν is a tuple ν = (S,A, T ),
with state space S, action space A, and transition kernel
T , { τ(· | s, a) | s ∈ S, a ∈ A} ,
indexed in S ×A such that τ(· | s, a) is a probability measure1 on S. If at time
t the environment is in state st ∈ S and the agent chooses action at ∈ A, then
the next state st+1 is drawn with a probability independent of previous states
and actions:
Pν(st+1 ∈ S | s
t, at) = τ(S | st, at) S ⊂ S. (2.1)
Finally, we shall use N for the class of CMPs.
In the above, and throughout the text, we use the following conventions. We
employ Pν to denote the probability of events under a process ν, while we use
st ≡ s1, . . . , st and at ≡ a1, . . . , at to represent sequences of variables. Similarly
St denotes product spaces, and S∗ ,
⋃∞
t=0 S
t denotes the set of all sequences
of states. Arbitrary-length sequences in S∗ will be denoted by s.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the transition kernel is not known
to the agent, who must estimate it through interaction. On the other hand,
the payoff function, chosen by the opponent, is revealed to the agent at the
beginning of each stage.
2.2 The payoff
At the k-th stage, a payoff function ρk : S∗ → [0, 1] is chosen by the opponent.
This encodes how desirable a state sequence is to the agent for the task. In
particular if s, s′ ∈ S∗ are two state sequences, then s is preferred to s′ in
round k if and only if ρk(s) ≥ ρk(s′). As a simple example, consider a ρ such
that, sequences s going through a certain state s∗ have a payoff of 1, while the
remaining have a payoff of 0.
The usual reinforcement learning (RL) setting can be easily mapped to this.
Recall that in RL the agent is acting in a Markov decision process [Puterman,
2005] µ (MDP). This is a CMP equipped with a set of distributions {R(· | s) | s ∈ S }
on rewards rt ∈ R. In the infinite-horizon, discounted reward setting, the utility
1We assume the measurability of all sets with respect to some appropriate σ-algebra. This
will usually be the Borel algebra B(X) of the set X.
3
is defined as the discounted sum of rewards
∑
t γ
trt, where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount
factor. We can map this to our framework, by setting: ρ(sT ) =
∑T
t=1 γ
t
E(rt |
st) =
∑T
t=1 γ
t
∫∞
−∞
r dR(r | st) to be the payoff for a state sequence sT . While
the theoretical development applies to general payoff functions, the experimental
results and algorithms use the RL setting.
2.3 The policy
After the payoff ρk is revealed to the decision maker, he chooses a policy πk,
which he uses to interact with the environment. The CMP ν = (S,A, T ) and
the payoff function jointly define an MDP, denoted by µk = (S,A, T , ρk). The
agent’s policy πk selects actions with distribution πk(at | st), meaning that the
policy is not necessarily stationary. Together with the Markov decision process
µk, it defines a distribution on the sequence of states, such that:
Pµk,πk(st+1 ∈ S | s
t) =
∫
A
τ(S | a, st) dπ(a | s
t).
This interaction results in a sequence of states s, whose utility to the agent is:
Uk , ρk(s), s ∈ S∗. Since the sequence of states is stochastic, we set the value
of each stage to the expected utility:
Vk , V (ρk, πk) , Eν,πk Uk =
∫
ρk(s) dP
π
ν (s), (2.2)
where P πν is the probability measure on S
∗ resulting from using policy π on
CMP ν. Finally, let us define the oracle policy for stage k:
Definition 2 (Oracle stage policy). Given the process ν and the payoff ρk at
stage k, the oracle policy is π∗(ν, ρk) , argmaxπ
∫
S∗
ρk(s) dP
π
ν (s).
This policy is normally unattainable by the agent, since ν is unknown. The
agent’s goal is to minimise the total expected regret 2 relative to the oracle:
LK ,
K∑
k=1
V (ρk, π
∗(ν, ρk))− Vk (2.3)
2.4 Sparse reward processes
The complete sparse reward process is a special case of a stochastic game. How-
ever, we are particularly interested in processes where only few states have
payoffs. We model this by mapping each payoff function to a finite measure on
S∗.
2We use a slightly different notion of regret from previous work. Instead of using the total
accumulated reward, as in [Jacksh et al., 2010], we consider the total expected utility across
stages. But, if one were to see the payoff obtained at every stage as the reward, the two
measures of regret would be equivalent.
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Definition 3. A sparse reward process is a multi-stage stochastic game with
K stages, where the k-th stage is a Markov decision process µk = (S,A, T , ρk),
whose payoff function ρk : S∗ → [0, 1], is revealed to the agent immediately
after k − 1 stage is complete. The agent chooses policy πk, with expected utility
Vk , V (ρk, πk). The Markov decision process terminates at time t the stage
ends, if st is a terminal state and with fixed termination probability q if st is
not a terminal state.
The process is called σ-sparse for a measure σ on S∗ if for every ρk ∈ R, the
payoff measure λk on S∗, defined as λk(S) =
∫
S
ρk(s) dσ(s), ∀S ⊂ S∗, satisfies
λk(S∗) ≤ 1. The agent’s goal is to find a sequence πk maximising
∑K
k=1 Vk.
The termination probability q is equivalent to an infinite horizon discounted
reward reinforcement learning problem [see Puterman, 2005]. Bounding the
total payoff forces the rewards available at most state sequences to be small
(though not necessarily zero). Finally, it ensures that the opponent cannot
place arbitrarily large rewards in certain parts of the space, and so cannot make
the regret arbitrarily large. Throughout the paper, we take σ to be the uniform
measure. The construction also enables much of the subsequent development,
through the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Given a payoff function ρ for which there exists a payoff measure λ
satisfying the conditions of Def. 3 for some σ, the utility of any policy π on the
MDP µ = (ν, ρ), can be written as:
Eπ,µ U =
∫
S∗
pπ,ν(s) dλ(s), (2.4)
where pπ,ν is the probability (density) of s (with respect to σ) under the pol-
icy π and the environment ν. We assume that pπ,ν always exists, but is not
necessarfily finite.
Proof. Via change of measure: EU =
∫
S
∗ρ(s) dPπ,ν(s) =
∫
S
∗ρ(s)pπ,ν(s) dσ(s) =∫
S
∗pπ,ν(s) dλ(s).
3 Properties
The optimality of an agent policy depends on the assumptions made about the
opponent. In a worst-case setting, it is natural to view each stage as a zero-sum
game, where the agent’s regret is the opponent’s gain. If the opponent is nature,
then the sparse reward process can be seen as an MDP. This is also true in the
case where we employ a prior over the opponent’s type.
3.1 When the opponent is nature
Consider the case when the opponent selects the payoffs ρk by drawing them
from some fixed, but unknown distribution with measure φ(· | θ), parametrised
by θ ∈ Θ, such that: P(ρk ∈ B) = φ(B | θ), ∀k ∈ { 1, 2, . . . ,K } , ∀B ⊂ R.
5
In that case, the Bayes-optimal strategy for the agent is to maintain a belief
on Θ ×N and solve the problem with backwards induction DeGroot [1970], if
possible. This is because of the following fact:
Theorem 1. When the opponent is Nature, the SRP is an MDP.
Proof. We prove this by construction. For a set of reward functions R, the
state space of the MDP can be factored into the reward function and the state
of the dynamics, so S = R×S0. If there are K reward functions, we can write
the state space as S =
⋃K
k=1 Sk. Let the action space be A, such and a set of
bijectionsMij : Si ↔ Sj . In addition, for any i, j all states s ∈ Si, the transition
probabilities obey: P(st+1 | st = s, at = a) = P(st+1 | st = Mi,j(s), at = a) and
P(st+1 ∈ Sj | st ∈ Si, at = a) = q if j 6= i and 1 − q otherwise. It is easy to
verify that this agrees with Def. 3.
Unfortunately, the Bayes-optimal solution is usually intractable [DeGroot,
1970, Duff, 2002, Gittins, 1989].
3.2 When the opponent is adversarial
We look at the problem from the perspective of Bayesian experimental design.
In particular, the agent has a belief, expressed as a measure ξ over N . Then,
the ξ-expected utility of any policy π is:
Eξ,π U =
∫
N
∫
S∗
U(s) dP πν (s) dξ(ν). (3.1)
Let P ∗ν and P
∗
ξ be the probability measures on S
∗ arising from the optimal policy
given the full CMP ν and given a particular belief ξ over CMPs respectively,
assuming known payoffs ρ. The opponent can take advantage of the uncertainty
and select a payoff function that maximises our loss relative to the optimal
policy:
ℓk(ξ, µ) , max
λ
∫
S∗
(P ∗ν − P
∗
ξ ) dλk. (3.2)
This implies that the opponent should maximise the payoff for sequences with
the largest probability gap between the ν- and ξ-optimal policies. To make
this non-trivial, we have restricted the payoff functions to λ(S∗) ≤ 1. In this
case, maximising ℓ requires setting λ(B) = 1 for the set of sequences B with
the largest gap, and 0 everywhere else. This the second type of sparseness that
SRPs have.
We now show that in a special two-stage version of our game, a strategy that
maximises the expected information gain minimises a bound on our expected
loss. First, we recall the definition of Lindley [1956]:
Definition 4 (Expected information gain). Assume some prior probability mea-
sure ξ on a parameter space N , and a set of experiments P, indexing a set of
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measures {P πν | ν ∈ N , π ∈ P } on X . The expected information gain of the
experiment π consisting of drawing an observation x from the unknown P πν is:
G(π, ξ) ,
∫
N
∫
X
ln
P πν (x)
P πξ (x)
dP πν (x) dξ(ν), (3.3)
where P πξ (x) is the marginal
∫
N
P πν (x) dξ(ν).
In our case, the parameter space N is the set of environment dynamics while
the observation set X is the the set of state-action sequences (S ×A)∗.
Theorem 2. Consider a two-stage game, where there for the the first stage,
ρ1 = 0. Then, maximising the expected information gain, in sufficient to min-
imise the expected regret.
Proof. Through the definition of the stage k loss (3.2), and as λ(S∗) ≤ 1:
ℓk(ξ, ν) = max
λ
∫
S
∗
(P ∗ν − P
∗
ξ ) dλ ≤ max
λ
∫
S
∗
|P ∗ν − P
∗
ξ | dλ
≤ λ(S∗)
∫
S
∗
|P ∗ν − P
∗
ξ | dσ ≤ ‖P
∗
ν − P
∗
ξ ‖,
(3.4)
where ‖P‖ =
∫
|P | dσ is the L1-norm with respect to σ. If our initial belief is ψ
and the (random) posterior after the first stage is ξ, the expected loss of policy
π is given by: Eψ,π ‖P
∗
ν −P
∗
ξ ‖. Finally, since for any measures P,Q it holds that
2
∫
lnP/Q dP ≤ ‖P −Q‖2, we have: G(π, ξ) ≥ Eξ,π
1
2
‖P πν −P
π
ξ ‖
2
1. Via Jensen’s
inequality we obtain that Eξ,π ‖P
π
ν − P
π
ξ ‖1 ≤
√
2G(π, ξ).
Thus, choosing a policy that maximises the expected information gain, min-
imises the expected worst-case loss at the next stage. This is in broad agreement
with past ideas of relating curiosity to gaining knowledge about the environ-
ment (e.g. work such as [Schmidhuber, 1991]). Consequently, pure information-
gathering strategies can have good quality guarantees in this two-stage adver-
sarial game.
For more general games, we must employ other strategies, however, as we
need to balance information gathering (exploration) with obtaining rewards in
the current stage (exploitation). Unfortunately, even finding the policy that
maximises (3.3) is as hard as finding the Bayes-optimal policy. For this reason,
in the next section we consider approximate algorithms.
4 Algorithms
We use two simple algorithms for SRPs, derived from two well-known strategies
for exploration in bandit problems and reinforcement learning in general. The
first, Upper Confidence bound SRP (UCSRP, Alg. 1) chooses policies based
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Algorithm 1 UCSRP: Upper Confidence bound SRP
1: for k = 1, . . . ,K do
2: Find the largest {Nǫ(Pˆπ) | π ∈ P} s.t. P(∃π : Pπ /∈ Nǫ(Pˆπ) ≤ 1/k),
3: Select πk ∈ argmaxπ V
+
π (ρk), from (4.2).
4: Execute πk, observe s, a; get payoff ρ(s).
5: Update {Pˆπ | π ∈ P} from s, a.
6: end for
Algorithm 2 BTSRP: Bayesian Thompson sampling SRP
1: Set initial beliefs ξ1(Pπ).
2: for k = 1, . . . ,K do
3: Sample νˆ ∼ ξk.
4: Choose πk = π
∗(νˆ, ρk).
5: Execute πk, observe s, a; get payoff ρ(s).
6: Calculate new posterior ξk+1(·) , ξk(· | s, a).
7: end for
on simple confidence bounds, similarly to UCB [Auer et al., 2002] for bandit
problems and UCRL [Jacksh et al., 2010] for general reinforcement learning.
The second, Bayesian Thompson sampling (BTSRP, Alg. 2), chooses a policy
by drawing samples from a posterior distribution, as in Strens [2000]. To simplify
the exposition, we restrict our attention to some arbitrary stage k and consider
a setting where we have a finite set of policies P .
UCSRP (Alg. 1) uses confidence regions. An abstract view of the method
is the following. For any policy π, let the empirical measure on S∗ be Pˆπ , and
let:
Nǫ(Pˆπ) ,
{
Q
∣∣∣ ‖Q− Pˆπ‖ ≤ ǫ} (4.1)
be a confidence region around the empirical measure, where ‖P‖ =
∫
|P | dσ is
the L1-norm with respect to σ. Then we define the optimistic value:
V +π , max
{
EQ ρ
∣∣∣ Q ∈ Nǫ(Pˆπ)} (4.2)
to be the value within the interval maximising the expected payoff. This can be
seen as an optimistic evaluation of the policy π that holds with high probability
and we choose πk ∈ argmaxπ V
+
π . For RL problems, there is no need to evaluate
all policies. The algorithm can be implemented efficiently via the augmented
MDP construction in Jacksh et al. [2010].
BTSRP (Alg. 2) draws a candidate CMP νk ∼ ξk from the belief at stage
k, and then calculates the stationary policy that is optimal for (νk, ρk). At the
end of the stage, the belief is updated via Bayes’s theorem:
ξk+1(B) =
∫
B
Pν(s | a) dξk(ν)∫
N
Pν(s | a) dξk(ν)
, (4.3)
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This type of Thompson sampling [Thompson, 1933] performs well in multi-
armed bandit problems [?], but its general properties are unknown.
Lemma 2. Consider a payoff function ρ with corresponding payoff measure λ.
Assume that ǫ is such that confidence regions hold, i.e. that Pπ ∈ Nǫ(Pˆπ) for
all π. For UCSRP to choose a sub-optimal policy π, it sufficient that:
E(ρ | Pπ∗) ≤ E(ρ | Pπ) + 2
∫
cπ dλ.
Proof. Since UCSRP always chooses π maximising P+π , if we choose a sub-
optimal π then it must hold that E(ρ | P+π∗) ≤ E(ρ | P
+
π ). Since the confidence
regions hold, E(ρ | Pπ∗) ≤ E(ρ | P
+
π∗), E(ρ | Pπ∗) ≤ E(ρ | P
+
π∗) and E(ρ | Pˆπ) ≤
E(ρ | Pπ + cπ). Consequently:
E(ρ | Pπ∗) ≤ E(ρ | P
+
π ) =
∫
(Pˆπ + cπ) dλ
≤
∫
(Pπ + cπ) dλ = E(ρ | Pπ) + 2
∫
cπ dλ
Theorem 3. Let cπ,k be the relevant signed measure for policy π in stage k.
Assume that ∃a, b > 0 s.t. ‖cπ,k‖ ≤ an
−b
π,k, with nπk =
∑k
i=1 I {πi = π}.
Proof. It will be convenient to use ρ′π = V (ρ, π) to denote the value of π for
payoff function ρ. This has the usual vector meaning. Let ρ = (ρk) be a
sequence of payoffs and let π∗k ∈ argmaxπ∈P ρ
′
kπ be an optimal policy at stage
k in hindsight, and let πk be our actual policy for that stage. Then the regret
after K stages, LK , is bounded as follows:
LK ≤ max
ρ
K∑
k=1
(ρ′kπ
∗
k − ρ
′
kπk)
= max
ρ
K∑
k=1
(
ρ′kπ
∗
k − ρ
′
k
∑
π∈P
π I {πk = π}
)
≤
∑
π∈P
K∑
k=1
max
ρk
I {πk = π} ρ
′
k(π
∗
k − π)
≤
∑
π∈P
K∑
k=1
max
ρk
I {ǫπ,k ≥ ∆π,k}∆π,k
where ǫπ,k = 2‖cπ,k‖λk,1, ∆π,k = ρ
′
k(π
∗
k − π).
The actual shape of the confidence region, for UCSRP, and the belief, for
BTSRP, depend on the model we are using. In general, they have the form
ci = an
−b
i , where ni is the number of times the i-th policy was chosen and
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a > 0, and b ≥ 1, but can be tighter if there is an interrelationship between
policies.
In both cases, a new stationary policy is selected at the beginning of each
stage. We consider two types of games, for which we employ slightly different
versions of the main algorithms. In the first game, each stage terminates after
the first action is taken. In the second game, each stage terminates only with
constant probability q at every time-step.
5 Experiments
We consider games having a total of K stages. In each stage, the agent observes
an payoff function of the form ρk(s
T ) =
∑T
t=1 r(st) and then selects a policy πk.
The environment is Markov, and the stage terminates with fixed probability q,
known to the agent.
Confidence intervals for UCSRP can be constructed via the bound ofWeissman et al.
[2003] on the L1 norm of deviations of empirical estimates of multinomial dis-
tributions. In order to construct an upper confidence bound policy efficiently,
we employ the method of UCRL [Jacksh et al., 2010], This solves an augmented
MDP where the action space is enlarged to additionally select between high-
probability MDPs. This guarantees that the policy acts according to the most
optimistic MDP in the high-probability region, as required by UCSRP.
For the BTSRP policy, we maintain a product-Dirichlet distribution (see for
example DeGroot [1970]) on the set of multinomial distributions for all state-
action pairs and a product of normal-gamma distributions for the rewards. We
then draw sample MDPs by drawing parameters from each individual part of
the product prior.
5.1 Opponents
For reasons of tractability, and better correspondence with the reinforcement
larning setting, the opponents we consider consider only additive payoff func-
tions, such that the same reward r(s) is always obtained when visiting state
s and the payoff of a sequence of states s1, . . . , st is simply ρ(s1, . . . , st) =∑t
k=1 r(st). We consider two types of opponents, nature, and a myopic adver-
sary.
Nature. In this case, the reward functions are sampled uniformly such that∑
s∈S r(s) = 1.
Adversarial. This opponent has knowledge of ν, and also maintains the em-
pirical estimate νˆ. Assuming that the agent’s estimates must be close to the
empirical estimate, the payoff is selected to maximise the stage loss (3.2). This
is a sparse payoff, as explained in Sec. 3.2, based on the empirical estimate
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rather than the (unknown) agent’s belief:
ρk ∈ argmax
ρ
V (ρ, π∗(ν, ρ))− V (ρ, π∗(νˆ, ρ)). (5.1)
5.2 Results
The results are summarised in Fig. 1. These also include a greedy agent, i.e.
the stationary policy which maximises payoff for the current stage in empiri-
cal expectation. In both cases, the regret suffered by the greedy agent grows
linearly, while that of BTSRP and UCSRP grows slowly for adversarial oppo-
nents. However, when the opponent is nature this is no longer the case. This is
due to the fact that the distribution of payoffs provides a natural impetus for
exploration even for the greedy agent.
PSfrag replacements
greedy
BTSRP
UCSRP
0
0
200 400 600 800 1000
20
40
60
80
100
120
(a) Adversarial, |S| = 4, |A| = 2, q = 0.5
PSfrag replacements
greedy
BTSRP
UCSRP
0
0
200
200
200
300
400
400
500
600 800 1000
(b) Adversarial, |S| = 8, |A| = 4, q = 0.5
1
2
3
4
5
PSfrag replacements
greedy
BTSRP
UCSRP
0
0
200 400 600 800 1000
20
40
60
80
100
120
(c) Nature, |S| = 4, |A| = 2, q = 0.5
5
10
15
20
25
PSfrag replacements
greedy
BTSRP
UCSRP
0
0
200
200
300
400
500
600 800 1000
(d) Nature, |S| = 8, |A| = 4, q = 0.1
Figure 1: Comparison of the expected cumulative regret after k stages, averaged
over 103 runs, between BTSRP and stagewise stationary greedy policies, on
randomly generated MDPs. Against nature, none of the policies suffer a large
amount of regret. Against an adversarial opponent, the greedy policy suffers
linear regret. When the opponent is nature, the exploring policies enjoy no
advantage.
11
6 Discussion
We introduced sparse reward processes, which capture the problem of acting in
an unknown environment with arbitrarily selected future objectives. We have
shown that, in an two-stage adversarial problem, a good strategy is to maximise
the expected information gain. This links with previous work on curiosity and
statistical decision theory. In fact, the connection of information gain to multiple
tasks had been arguably recognised by Lindley [1956]
. . . although indisputably one purpose of experimentation is to reach
decisions, another purpose is to gain knowledge about the state of
nature (that is, about the parameters) without having specific ac-
tions in mind.
We have evaluated three algorithms on various problem instances. Overall, when
the opponent is nature, even the greedy strategy performs relatively well. This
is because it is forced to explore the environment by the sequence of payoffs.
However, an adversarial opponent necessitates the use of the more sophisticated
algorithms, which tend to explore the environment. This is partially explained
by results in the related setting of multi-armed bandit problems with covari-
ates Pavlidis et al. [2008], Rigollet and Zeevi [2010], Yang and Zhu [2002], ?.
There, again the payoff function is given at the beginning of every stage. In that
setting, however, the opponent is nature and, more importantly, the only thing
observed after an action is chosen is a noisy reward signal. So, in some sense, it is
a harder problem than the one considered herein (and indeed Rigollet and Zeevi
[2010] prove a lower bound). The one-armed covariate bandit ? for an exponen-
tial family model, and proves that a myopic policy is asymptotically optimal, in
a discounted setting. This ties in very well with our results on problems where
the opponent is nature.
Finally, SRPs are related to other multi-task learning settings. For exam-
ple [Lugosi et al., 2008], consider the problem of online multi-task learning with
hard constraints. That is, at every round, the agent takes an action in each
and every task, but there are some constraints which reflect the tasks’ sim-
ilarity. Somewhat closer to SRPs is the game-theoretic setting of ?, where
again the agent is solving a multi-objective problem where the goal is that
a reward vector approaches a target set. Finally, there is a close relation to
the problem of learning with multiple bandits [Dimitrakakis and Lagoudakis,
2008, Gabillon et al., 2011]. Essentially, this problem involves finding near-
optimal policies for a number of possibly related sub-problem within a search
budget. In [Gabillon et al., 2011] the tasks are unrelated bandit problems, while
in [Dimitrakakis and Lagoudakis, 2008] the tasks are actually different states of
a Markov decision process and the goal is to find the best initial actions given
a rollout policy.
Finally, our experimental results show that a greedy policy is a good strategy
when the payoff sequence is (uniformly) stochastic. This naturally encourages
exploration, even for non-curious agents, by forcing them to visit all states fre-
quently. UCSRP and BTSRP, which explore naturally, perform much better
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for adversarial payoffs. Then the greedy player suffers linear total regret. Con-
sequently, we may conclude that curiosity is not in fact necessary when the
constant change of goals forces exploration upon the agent.
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